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Abstract
This thesis seeks to explore natural courts and ideology among members of
the Supreme Court. Most studies of the Supreme Court allocate focus to the
chief justice such that the justice and his ideology determines whether the Court
will be described as liberal or conservative for the chief’s tenure. However, this
thesis questions this model of distinction for the highest court in the land. An
analysis of natural courts from Marshall through Roberts specifically targets the
highest and lowest ideological shifts between natural courts to understand how
vacancies and replacements manipulate the ideology of the Court. In addition to
the changes in justices on the Court, this thesis investigates how the length of a
natural court affects voting behavior. The analysis of these two factors leads the
author to conclude that the current model of labeling a given court is insufficient in
capturing the ideology. While a change in the chief justice may shift the ideology of
the Court one way or the other, such evidence only further substantiates the claim
that it is the most junior justice who determines the ideological shift of the Court.
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1 Introduction
This thesis seeks to explore natural courts and ideology among members of the Supreme
Court. Most studies of the Supreme Court allocate focus to the chief justice such that
the justice and his ideology determines whether the Court will be described as liberal
or conservative for the chief‘s tenure. However, this thesis questions this model of distinction for the highest court in the land. An analysis of natural courts from Marshall
through Roberts specifically targets the highest and lowest ideological shifts between natural courts to understand how vacancies and replacements manipulate the ideology of the
Court. In addition to the changes in justices on the Court, this thesis investigates how the
length of a natural court affects voting behavior. The analysis of these two factors leads
the author to conclude that the current model of labeling a given court is insufficient in
capturing the ideology. While a change in the chief justice may shift the ideology of the
Court one way or the other, such evidence only further substantiates the claim that it is
the most junior justice who determines the ideological shift of the Court.
Two questions were posed in this thesis, allowing for the exploration of the Supreme
Court Database. The first inquiry asks the following: do departing and replacement justices contribute more radically to the ideological shifts of the Court than does the serving
chief justice? Given the changing nature of the Supreme Court, albeit less dramatic than
changes from the two more democratically elected branches of government, as new associate justices fill vacancies on the bench, it would stand to reason that there may be
more to learn about the ideology of the Court from the most junior justice than can be
learned by its chief.From brief observation of recent natural courts, it would seem that
replacement justices do more to sway the ideology of the Court than do chief justices.
Since the election of President Trump, three conservative justices, Neil Gorsuch, Brett
5

Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett1 have taken their seats on the highest court in the
land. In a short tenure, both have proved to vote right of center in some distinguishing cases (Thomson-DeVeaux 2019). With the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and subsequent vacancy of her seat, the Court has many opportunities to shift even further to the right if the president and senate can nominate and confirm a justice before
Republicans lose either the White House or a Senate majority.
Sparking interest in this topic was the former Justice John Paul Stevens. In his book
Five Chiefs he writes that he believes there may be some merit to the claim: there is
more “trouble” done to the Court by a replacement justice than the presiding chief justice
(2011). Having served more than twenty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens saw
justice after justice replaced and, subsequently, felt the shocks of junior justices who made
their presence known on the court. Ultimately, this led him to conclude that replacement
justices indeed have an unstudied magnitude on the Court that a chief justice simply
cannot always muster. Perhaps a chief with moderate views can sway the ideology of the
Court from case to case, but even then that tenure is cut short by an ambitious junior
justices who reflect a different ideology from their predecessor. Two chapters of this thesis
are dedicated to the exploration of the validity of Justice Steven‘s observation.
The second question lies with the longevity of natural courts: how does the length
of a natural court‘s tenure effect its ideological score? Most notable of chief justices
who rallied the Court together for opinion writing was Chief Justice Marshall. Desiring
unanimity of decision making over schismatic dissents from opposing members, the chief
rallied his bench to strength a fading branch of government. Today, many political
scientists acknowledge the impact Chief Justice Marshall had on his subordinates. Such
a strategy played well for the Court and granted them the place as the third branch of
government as exercised today. Perhaps later justices realized this model, recreating it
model for future success in a court legitimized by unanimity. If this was true for John
Marshall and his court, do similar examples exist that would suggest the longevity of
1

At the time this thesis was written, no data was available for the newest justice on the Court.
The data from the Supreme Court Database spans from 1791 to a few decisions which include Justice
Kavanuagh.
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a natural court brings ideology together? Conversely, the practice could have quite the
opposite effect of driving justices further into their ideological camps, deeper into their
long-held beliefs. Such a claim states explicitly the goal of the final analysis chapter of
this thesis.
The results of these analyses were clear: the most junior justice has the greatest
affect on the ideological direction of the Court. When a justice departs from the bench,
if his or her replacement is of similar ideology, the shift of the ideology of the Court is
negligible. If the replacement justice is ideologically dissimilar to his or her predecessor,
the ideological shift of the Court is much more dramatic. Similarly, when a natural court
retains its members for a long period of time, the shift to the Court is much less drastic.
And, members of the Court begin to vote together, making the Court balanced one way
or the other. In chapters four, five, and six, these results will be further analyzed and
the ideology of specific justices sitting on the Court during shifts or long natural courts
will be discussed.

2 Literature Review
Before exploring the research questions as outlined in the introduction, it is important
to note the growing field of academic literature on the Supreme Court. Much literature
has explored the Supreme Court, specifically the decision making of justices and how the
ideology of a justice affects his or her own decision making. However, lacking in almost
all the literature is an analysis of all justices from Marshall to the seventh natural court
of Chief Justice John Roberts. Nonetheless, the current academic research pertaining to
the ideological shifts of the Court and natural courts is detailed as follows.
Two scholars quintessential to study of the Supreme Court are Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover. In 1989, they developed a process for scoring the ideology of justices based
on newspaper editorials (Segal and Cover 1989). The resulting score has been dubbed the
Segal-Cover score. From Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice Anthony Kennedy, editorials relating to their ideology from presidential nomination until the confirmation process
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were analyzed for some hint at the judicial philosophy of the upcoming justice. As an
independent source, the editorials gave a full view of the justice without a single decision
being made at the Supreme Court (Segal and Cover 1989). The model produced scores
that showed a high correlation between the ideology of the justice before confirmation
and his or her votes in civil liberties cases once on the Court. However, this method does
not account for the shift in ideology over the course of a justice‘s tenure as it relates to a
long-serving natural court. Additionally, the scope of this study was limited to justices
from Warren to Kennedy. The Supreme Court Database includes data on justice voting
from the beginning of the Court through the 2019 term. Such a sample allows for greater
analysis and more definable trends in justice ideology.
Another inquiry of the Supreme Court by David Cottrell, Charles R. Shipan, and
Richard J. Anderson seeks to understand the connection between presidential nominations
and change to the Supreme Court (2019). Here, the model showed how presidential
appointments pull the ideological direction of the Court, either toward the president‘s
ideology or away from it. The researchers developed a model to show when a presidential
nominee to the Supreme Court would draw the Court closer to the “ideal point” of the
president, influencing the Court long after the president‘s tenure had ended (Cottrell,
Shipan, and Anderson 2019). In addition to determining the scope of influence the
president has in shifting the ideology of the Court, the test also found what constraints
other institutions placed on this process, namely Senate confirmation voting. The model
accurately predicted the ideological shift of the Court given that the Senate and the
president were on the same side ideologically and the departing justice was on the opposite
side of the ideological scale. Thus, when these two conditions are met, the nominated
justice will bring the median of the Court closer to the ideal point of the president
(2019). Such a test indirectly shows how departing and replacement justices affect the
ideological shifts of the Court, but with further explanation. While this model certainly
adds substantially to the knowledge on presidential power and how the ideology of the
Court changes over time, it fails to test factors beyond the president and Senate that
could further explain shifts in the Court‘s median point.
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Further study of the Supreme Court is derived from Christopher P. Banks‘ writing on
Supreme Court precedent among natural courts. A main contention of the research suggests that constitutional flux, the idea that the practice of stare decisis ebbs and flows
depending on the majority of the Court, can account for large ideological shifts from
one natural court to the next (Banks 1992). The flux is further analyzed as a product of
democratic forces outside of the Supreme Court, the president and Senate, that nominate
and confirm justices to the bench. Taken with the work of Cottrell, Shipan, and Anderson, this conclusion stands to reason. And while the Court has a discretionary docket,
that discretion can only be sustained by the actors on the Court. If the president fails to
nominate and the Senate fails to confirm a justice of a certain ideological position, the
Court will not see that representation on the Court in some capacity. So the president
and Senate have political control over the Court as it determines the ideological makeup.
Maybe the closest research to the inquiry faced in this thesis, Contrell, Shipman, and
Anderson’s model surely offers a reasonable explanation as to why natural courts shift;
however, its scope is limited from Marshall’s first natural court to Rehnquist’s tenure
through 1991. Such a model also neglects significant insight into departing and replacement justice. The research seemingly limits the shifts to an understanding of the Court
of a chief justice, where the shifting ideology of the Court is examined across the chief’s
tenure rather than attributing the change to a particularly dynamic new member of the
Court.
The research from previous studies serves to illustrate the lack of literature pertaining
to the ideological shifts that occur because of a vacancy on the Supreme Court as opposed
to the sitting chief justice. Banks is one of a few researchers to note the significant
changes in ideology between natural courts, as Cottrell, Shipan, and Anderson take an
executive perspective to understanding these shifts. And while Segal and Cover note the
ideological scores of justices, this offers little to the study of shifts in the Court relative
to vacancies and replacements. Surely, the results found in this research confirm previous
research. What is added is an understanding of how specific justices through departure
and replacement make for a better categorization of the Court than the chief justice.
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Furthermore, the longevity of a natural court is scarcely discussed in existing scholarly
literature. So, the questions posed in this thesis will add to the research on the Supreme
Court and provide yet another variable to discuss in analysis of the highest court in the
land.

3 Method
Fundamental to this study is the use of the Supreme Court Database, which cumulates
judicial information from 1791 until 2019. The Supreme Court Database serves as a
comprehensive set of information about cases argued, outcomes, opinion writing, and
decision voting. With every case since the beginning of the Court, the database allows
for rigorous testing based on different variables. The purpose of this thesis is to explore
how the most junior associate justice of the Supreme Court alters the ideology of the
proceeding natural court. To allow for a clear picture of how this is accomplished, the
variable decisionDirection as it pertains to the Chief Justice and natural court was analyzed and manipulated. This variable is the most intriguing and helpful variable for this
discussion because it marks conservative and liberal votes based on the majority opinion
written by the Court. For a conservative decision, 1 is assigned to decisionDirection. For
a liberal decision, 2 is assigned to decisionDirection. Now understanding the nature of
the variables researched, the process of developing the first working data set for analysis
of the Court’s ideology can be established.
Several variables were created in the process of developing the research for this thesis.
The variables, how they were created, and how they affect the conclusions of the thesis
follow. One, the mean decision direction for each natural court was determined, excluding
all missing and non-ideological decisions. Two, affirmances of lower court decisions were
removed from the mean decision to create a second mean decision direction variable.
Without the affirmances, the data more thoroughly reflected ideological stances of the
Court since to affirm of a lower court ruling does not change existing constitutional
law as evidenced by the significantly disparate difference in the mean decision direction
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variances2 . Three, the ideological score of the natural court was processed. This consisted
of finding the mean of the decision direction variable found in process two for both the
data set with affirmances counted and with affirmances dropped. Four, the absolute value
of the difference between the ideology (found in step three) and the decision direction
(found in step two) was then calculated. This allows for each natural court to be compared
with one another. By comparing the absolute value of the mean decision direction and
the ideology, the data set ordered ideology of each natural court from greatest to least.
Such ordering allowed for a thorough analysis of what creates ideological shifts from
one natural court to the next. Five, the final process completed was to determine the
direction of the shift. For each absolute value of ideological shift, the true difference was
taken. A negative ideological value promoted a more conservative court and a positive
ideological value a more liberal court. Such directional shifts were labeled “Conservative”
for conservative shifts and “Liberal” for liberal shifts.
The manipulation of the decision direction into quantifiable ideological scores and
shifts created a model to understand how the ideological score of natural courts shifted
over time and between justices. It should be noted that these shifts are proportional
changes in the “liberalism” or “conservatism” of the Court. While the data gives an idea
of a direction of shift and ideology of the junior justice and natural court, it more clearly
represents the number of changes in liberal and conservative outcomes, not how liberal
or conservative a justice is or was compared to his or her predecessor. The findings from
these analyses are intriguing in comparison to current understandings of the Supreme
Court. Two tests followed from the new data set. First, do junior associate justices
recently appointed to the Court shift the ideology of the previous Court? To complete
this analysis, the ideology of the outgoing and incoming justices were compared. The
eight highest scoring ideological shifts and the five lowest served as the source for analysis.
These Courts should show that the more ideologically different the justice is, the greater
the shift in the Court’s decisions. And such shifts should not depend on the current Chief
Justice. Rather, the most junior justices, whether the chief justice or an associate justice,
2

This idea is credited to Dr. Charles E. Smith at the University of Mississippi.
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could have an equally, if not more, powerful effect on the natural court for which he or
she is appointed and confirmed. The results for this inquiry are discussed in the fourth
and fifth chapters of this thesis.
The second test that followed this data set was this: does the longevity of the natural
court account for smaller ideological shifts in the natural court than shorter natural
courts? To conduct this inquiry, the same method of manipulating the data was used as
with constructing the decision direction data. But this time, the term years were included
to note how many years a natural court persisted. Once the data set was built, a simple
count of the number of years per natural court was conducted, producing the number
of years a natural court persisted. Again, the shift in ideology was taken into account,
comparing the absolute value to the length of the natural court. Then, the difference
between ideology and decision direction was matched to its corresponding absolute value
to denote in which direction the court shifted. Those shifts that were negative were
labeled as “Conservative” and those that were positive “Liberal.” Because the amount of
shift is more important than the direction of the shift for the research of this questions,
the labels only serve to help understand what voices on the Court had the most influence,
that is did the conservative or liberal bloc bring the natural court toward its ideology. The
data was ranked from highest to lowest absolute difference in ideological shift and also
longest to shortest natural court. While less conclusive than the ideological shifts between
natural courts, the data still has a story to tell about the role of time on ideological shifts
for a natural court. The results of this inquiry is determined in the sixth chapter.

4 The Five Lowest
As a baseline of understanding the model created in this inquiry, the five lowest ideological
score shifts of natural courts will now be examined. Those associate justices which were
replaced gives a litmus test in marking the viability of the hypothesis that it is the most
junior justice, where junior refers to the length of time the justice has served on the
Court, who determines the ideology of the Court rather than the chief justice. In fact,
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included among this data set was the replacement of a chief justice (Taft replacing White).
As such, a study of these five scores and associated twelve justices proceeds, noting the
ideology of the outgoing and incoming associate justices, the president nominating each
justice, the natural court in which the shift took place, and the presiding chief justice.

4.1 Sherman Minton and William J. Brennan, Jr.
The lowest absolute difference of ideology score was with Chief Justice Warren’s fifth
natural court at a mere 0.000473 , a value statistically insignificant and marking an undetectable shift. Here, two justices were replaced, Justice William J. Brennan replacing
Justice Sherman Minton and Justice Charles Evans Whittaker replacing Justice Forman
Reed. Both incoming justices were appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower which
one could assume meant that the two justices held similar ideologies. While this is not the
case and the justices followed contrasting ideologies in voting and decision making, the
change on the Court was minuscule. The balance of the Court was maintained because
the two joining justices, Minton and Reed, were of differing judicial ideologies replacing
predecessors of contrasting judicial ideologies.
To begin, the Minton and Brennan replacement will be examined. Associate Justice
Sherman Minton was a Truman appointee serving seven years on the Court. Much of
the literature pertaining to Justice Minton largely explores his effectiveness as a justice,
some placing him in the category of “worst” justices. However, Linda Gugin develops an
argument in favor of Minton’s judicial style and compares him to Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan. Minton like his colleagues practiced judicial restraint in voting and decision
making. He most inclined to intervene in areas relating to civil rights, voting to protect
minority rights and overturning legislation that quelled those rights (Gugin 2009).
Also revealing of Justice Minton’s tenure was his previous seat in the U.S. Senate.
Prior to serving on the Court, Minton was an active participant in the upper house of
Congress when Franklin Roosevelt was president. According to Gugin, Minton was partic3

All values for both the ideological shifts and shifts of the natural court are based on a -1 to 1 scale,
where a negative number represented a conservative shift of the Court and a positive number represented
a liberal shift.

13

ularly frustrated with the Supreme Court in overturning legislation from Roosevelt’s New
Deal (2009). His reasoning for frustration was rooted in the idea that the Court should
respect the laws created by the legislature, only intervening when egregious overreach into
individual rights took place at the hand of the government. In fact, he believed the legislature to be more powerful because it was subjected to democracy unlike the monolithic
Court whose members served without the pressure of public opinion. So passionately did
Justice Minton hold fast to judicial restraint that as a senator he sponsored legislation
that would require a seven-person majority to pronounce the unconstitutionality of a
legislative piece. Those actions of Minton before his tenure as an associate justice and
his decision making on the Court aligned him with a more liberal ideology as defined by
the Supreme Court Database.
His replacement, William J. Brennan, Jr., could similarly be marked as holding liberal
ideology. One of the most recognizably progressive justices of the Court, Justice Brennan
grounded his ideology in affirmative action. Writing the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron two
years after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Brennan proved his progressive stance
and brought desegregation into the south.
Later in his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was noted for his attitude towards
rights of expression. Contrasted to Justice Antonin Scalia by Richard Brisbin, Jr., the
polarized figures demarked staunchly different views to judicial interpretation (1993).
Brennan relied on less abstract legal reasoning and more on instrumentation of the law.
The mere fact that Scalia and Brennan were opposed ideologically exhibits the nature of
Brennan as a progressive on the Court.
Considering the ideology of Minton and Brennan sheds light on the validity of the
inquiry, if not as just one example of its success. Each justice was committed to progressive values while on the Court, voting liberally and penning opinions which reflected the
same philosophy. While the decision making of both justices resulted in liberal outcomes,
their means of coming to such conclusions were opposed. This might explain the slight
shift towards a liberal ideology, although statistically insignificant. The second pair to
be studied under this natural court are Justices Reed and Whittaker.
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4.2 Stanley Forman Reed and Charles Evans Whittaker
Also taking the Court during Warren’s fifth natural court was Justice Charles Evans
Whittaker replacing Justice Stanley Forman Reed. The predecessor, Reed, was the final
Franklin D. Roosevelt appointment to leave the bench. While often overlooked as a
mediocre judge in comparison with his colleagues, which included Blackmun, Frankfurter,
and Warren, his tenure was markedly similar to other civil rights activists on the bench
serving at the same time. Before his appointment, he served as the Solicitor General and
spent almost three years defending the New Deal before the members of the highest court
(Pricket 1981). His dutiful work before the Supreme Court would eventually earn him a
spot as a legal mind the president could trust for protecting the power of the executive.
Once on the Court, Justice Reed maintained his ideology of an “organic Constitution”
that would govern his opinion writing (Pricket 1981). In a case regarding Jehovah’s
Witnesses and distributing pamphlets door to door, he noted that localities could limit
one’s First Amendment right to free speech considering the “changing conditions” of
modern times which had become a nuisance for urban citizens (Pricket 1981). The city
ordinance ensured privacy of city-dwellers who were growing in population thanks to
modern advances. This and other rulings served to shape how future courts viewed
privacy laws and the scope of the First Amendment.
The movement of an organic Constitution seemed to stop for Justice Reed when it
came to Plessy v. Ferguson. While he did submit to unanimity, he was the last of the
dissenters to sign onto the opinion, knowing that such a case would impact Southern
states gravely. The case in his eyes was decided for the benefit of the Court rather
than the advancements of civil rights. Whether this tarnishes his reputation as a liberalleaning justice is irrelevant when considering the precedent set by his signing onto such
a monumental case. He decidedly placed his foot in the camp of the liberal bloc. More
notably, he proved his desire to maintain the institution that is the Supreme Court,
which may be a better indicator of his voting pattern rather than a certain ideology.
Considering he took this approach in decisions after Plessy v. Ferguson (i.e. Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins), this reasoning serves its purpose as the most prominent basis for
15

Justice Reed’s voting behavior. Nevertheless, it placed him in the liberal bloc and gave
a seat to preserve to Charles Evans Whittaker.
Eisenhower’s second appointment for replacement of this natural court, took staunchly
liberal stances in civil rights cases. Before his tenure on the Court, Whittaker as a judge
on the federal circuit had ruled to desegregate and uphold such cases as Brown v. Board
of Education (Berman 1959). His liberal streak continued on the Supreme Court in cases
about the swiftness of desegregating schools and enforcing the new constitutional law
that had been established in courts prior to his time on the Court.
Justice Whittaker was also known for his avid dismissal of constitutional claims in
cases dealing with suspected Communist Party members (Berman 1959). In a lower court
ruling, Whittaker states that a university board had an obligation to dismiss faculty members belonging to “a found and declared conspiracy by a godless group to overthrow our
government by force” (Berman 1959). His strong remarks on the subject were supported
during his committee and confirmation hearings; however, they did not go unnoticed by
left wing members of the Senate who questioned the constitutionality in limiting academic freedom. This decision gives him a marked conservative edge in ideology. Once on
the Court, Whittaker seems to have softened on the point of communism when it came to
immigration cases. In a case regarding the status of deportation for an illegal immigrant
after he had been a member of the Communist Party, Whittaker came to the conclusion
that his subsequent departure from that ideology would warrant him worthy of lawful
status in the country and not subject to deportation.
This first look at replacement justices serves to confirm the hypothesis that newly
appointed justices give more indication as to the ideology of the Court than a chief
justice. Where the chief justice could be serving across the tenure of many justices, the
most junior justice can shift or maintain the ideology of the seat he or she is replacing.
So minute was the shift in this circumstance, the ideology shift was 0.00047, that it is
statistically insignificant. Justices Brennan and Whittaker shared much in common with
their predecessors, maintaining the power of the liberal bloc on the Court.
All told, both of Eisenhower’s replacement justices did little to shift the ideology of the
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Court to which they were appointed. Both Justices Brennan and Whittaker maintained
the liberal bloc of the Court that Justices Minton and Reed had established during their
tenures. Unique to this round of replacement justices is that it came in a pair. It was
not common for a group of justices to be appointed to a new natural court, especially
maintaining the ideology of the Court. The remaining pairs worth noting in this research
do not appear until the five highest ideological shifts are examined.

4.3 Stephen Johnson Field and Joseph McKenna
The second lowest ideological shift of the Court occurred in 1897 when Justice Joseph
McKenna replaced Justice Stephen Johnson Field on Chief Justice Fuller’s eighth natural
court. From the vacancy and replacement, a small shift towards the liberal bloc occurred,
that of only 0.00649. The replacement of Justice Field surely did little to fixate the
ideology of the Court farther in either a liberal or conservative direction as the discussion
that follows will show. Justice Field was the longest serving appointee of President
Abraham Lincoln, and, until Justice William Douglas, was the longest serving member
of the Supreme Court (Zuckert 2011). A Democrat from the new state of California,
Field was antislavery and for the North in the War between the States. Zuckert notes
that Field held a unique judicial philosophy coined as Lochnerism after the case Lochner
v. New York (2011). Such a philosophy relies on the economic principle of laissez-faire,
favoring rulings that adhered to the natural law and natural rights while holding to
social Darwinism. Thus was created a judicial liberalism which regarded capitalism in a
favorable light.
Furthermore, the judicial philosophy of Field held to the belief that special interests
were not taken up by government backing, leaving the citizenry free to participate in
society, and also government involvement in promoting common goods (Zuckert 2011).
Zuckert asserts that Justice Field was the architect of judicial liberalism and that the
justice was consistent in his decision making because of such a philosophy. One area
of constitutional law that this doctrine shines through is in regards to the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Butcher’s Union v. Crescent City, Justice Field makes clear his philos17

ophy:
[States] can now, as then, legislate to promote health, good order and peace,
to develop their resources, enlarge their industries, and advance their property. It [the Fourteenth Amendment] only inhibits discriminating and partial
enactments, favoring some to the impairment of the rights of others.The principal, if not the sole, purpose of its prohibitions is to prevent any arbitrary
invasion by state authority of the rights of person and property, and to secure
to everyone the right to pursue his happiness unrestrained, except by just,
equal, and impartial laws.
Here, Justice Field writes that states in their special interests should not have the right
to infringe on the rights of individuals when life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are
threatened.
One of the most famous dissents by the jurist proves Field’s judicial philosophy: his
dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases. This opinion noted that a monopoly infringes on the
rights of the individual in such a way that natural rights as laid out in the Declaration
of Independence are hindered. Thus, natural rights take precedent over the rights of a
company, or the state of Louisiana in granting monopoly rights to the slaughterhouse as
this case deals with. While the cases marking Justice Field’s judicial philosophy largely
deal with economic ideas, their effects had major implications on the lives of the individual
when it comes to Fourteenth Amendment rights. Field’s judicial liberalism set him on
the left of the Court, making his predecessor’s ideology of little shift once the vacancy
was filled.
Justice Joseph McKenna, nominated by President William McKinley, proved to take
maintain the liberal judicial philosophy of that of his predecessor. Little is documented
about the former justice; however, his political and judicial career before rising to the
highest court in the land offers some insight as to the ideology of the justice.
Like his predecessor, Justice McKenna hailed from the state of California after his parents moved there from Philadelphia, PA (1897). Of the Roman Catholic faith, McKenna
carried his strong moral standings into his legal profession and eventually into the opinion
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writing process (1897). Before being appointed to the Supreme Court, Joseph McKenna
served on the state legislature and in Congress. He was a Republican which shows the
similarities on a fundamental level to his predecessor who was antislavery and pro-North
in the Civil War.
When a vacancy occurred on the federal circuit in California, then-President Harrison
appointed him to the position (1897). His opinions while judge were largely related to
questions on international law, such as controversies on the treatment of Chinese immigrants (1897). Subsequently, with McKinley winning his bid for president, he assigned
McKenna to be the Attorney General of the United States. The friendship garnered between the two while they both served in Congress led to the appointment as the Attorney
General and kept McKenna close in the event of Supreme Court vacancy. His experience
in all three branches of government made for his nomination to the Court by President
McKinley. As shown by the small amount of information known about the jurist, his
decision making varied nominally from his predecessor and allowed the ideology of the
Court to remain rather congruent to the preceding natural court.

4.4 Edward Douglass White and William Howard Taft
The next lowest absolute shift in the Court comes from the replacement of one chief justice
for another. While this example may seem to prove that the chief justice does indeed have
ideological control over the Court in his ability to shift or maintain ideological norms does
quite the opposite. In fact, Chief Justices Edward Douglass White and William Howard
Taft show that the vacancy and replacement model of understanding ideological shifts of
the Court holds true. When a justice having a similar ideological score of his predecessor
takes to the bench, the shift of the Court will be nominal. The shift from Chief Justice
White to Chief Justice Taft is a measly -0.00713. A conservative trend of such small
caliber notes that Chief Justice Taft did not vary greatly with his predecessor Chief
Justice White. To explore this argument further, Chief Justice White and his ideology
will be examined.
Chief Justice Edward Douglass White was the ninth chief justice to the Supreme
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Court, nominated to the Court by President Grover Cleveland and, ironically enough,
elevated to chief justice by then-President Taft, was a Southern Democrat who fought
for the Confederacy in the Civil War (Forman 1970). His later political involvement
included the state Senate for Louisiana, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and a stint in
the United States Senate after taking time to further pursue his legal degree. From the
Senate, he was appointed to the Supreme Court 1894, replacing Chief Justice Fuller in
1910. His history as a Southern Democrat would seem to point him as a conservative
decision maker. The opposite is true.
In a dissent for the case Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company, Chief Justice
White made his opinion on civil liberties known (1895):
Teach the lesson that settled principles may be overthrown at any tine, and
confusion and turmoil must ultimately result.... The fundamental conception
of a judicial body is that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding
on the court without regard to the personality of its members. Break down
this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that this court is to depart
from the settled conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all
according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our
Constitution will be bereft of value and become a most dangerous instrument
to the rights and liberties of the people.
Another principle for which he argues against in this dissent is that of stare decisis.
Whenever constitutional law detracts from the progress of society, Chief Justice White
would argue that such constitutional law should be reevaluated and replaced (Forman
1970).
The replacement for Chief Justice White was the man who elevated him to chief on
the Court, William Howard Taft. Taft’s assent to chief justice was just one of the many
roles he served in the United States government. Before his tenure on the Court, Taft was
appointed to the Federal circuit in 1891 and served under President Theodore Roosevelt
as the Secretary of War. He became the twenty-seventh president of the United States
in 1909 serving only one term. In 1921, President Harding nominated him to the bench,
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culminating his many accomplishments and ending where he had always wanted to serve:
the Supreme Court (Freidel and Sidey 2006).
Given his detailed history as a Republican politician, it serves to reason that Taft
would significantly alter the ideological position of the Court. However, like his predecessor, he was all too eager to overturn those previous decisions when constitutional law
should be changed or reverted. His judicial perspective lied closely to upholding federalism (Post 1992). By many judicial scholars and members of the Court, he was described
as “a rock-ribbed conservative”, ruling in favor of conservative ideology (Post 1992). But
the characterization falls flat when observed through the eyes of federalism, as Post notes
(1992). In Lambert v. Yellowley, Taft signed onto the opinion of Justice Brandeis which
argued that Congress has directive over a doctor prescribing spirits for medical remedy,
precisely because the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the sell of alcohol (1926). This
case served as a counterexample to the side of the Court he normally joined, noting that
national power is a necessity to the strength of legislative authority.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Taft often subscribed to the liberal philosophy of Chief
Justice John Marshall saying of his idol that he was “the greatest Judge that America or
the World has produced” (Post 1992). Thus, national sovereignty was a hallmark of Chief
Justice Taft’s rulings, making him more liberal than what is initially prescribed to him.
His turn toward legislative authority and nationalized power is bolstered in both Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy RR. Co. and Stafford
v. Wallace. These two cases upheld Congressional authority over federal regulation of
commerce. So, as these two justices initially seem at odds in their judicial philosophies,
their exercise prove to make Taft statistically insignificantly more conservative to White.

4.5 Robert Trimble and John McLean
The three cases of ideological shifts thus far have dealt with more modern justices. This
pair, Justice Robert Trimble departing and Justice John McLean replacing, harken back
to the beginnings of the Court, the eighth natural court under Chief Justice John Marshall. Trimble’s vacancy was filled in 1827, causing the Court to shift 0.00802 of an
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ideological point. A slight move toward the liberal bloc of the Court, although essentially
imperceptible based on decision making and voting patterns, will be discussed.
Justice Robert Trimble was nominated to the bench by President John Quincy Adams.
Heralding from Kentucky, back when the state was still in it’s infancy and life there was
primitive, his family was deeply pious (Schneider 1947). Once an established lawyer in
Kentucky, Trimble was elected to the House of Representatives in 1802 (Schneider 1947).
Little is known of his service there except that he served only one term in Congress,
choosing to return home where he could make a living enough to support his family
(Schneider 1947). A few years later, he was appointed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
There, he authored sixty-three opinions, half of all decisions made by the Court. Until
being appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States, he returned home and
declined several high positions, such as Kentucky Supreme Court chief justice and U.S.
Senator because they did not pay enough to support his family. While he served on the
Federal Court, he voiced his disdain for federal supremacy, arguing instead for a strong
national government (Schneider 1947). He insisted that federal law had supremacy over
state law, a contentious belief as America was becoming a nation. Dying just three years
after assuming his position on the Supreme Court, Justice Trimble issued one opinion
Ogden v. Saunders and often deferred to Chief Justice John Marshall as their ideologies
were relatively similar (Currie 1983).
The life of Justice Trimble is little known; however, his firm stance for a strong
national government to which the states submitted made his ideology clearly to the left.
His predecessor, Justice John McLean, was nominated to the Court by President Andrew
Jackson. Much like Justice Trimble, McLean had a long record of public service to his
country and his home state of Ohio. Such service included United States Congressman,
judge on the Supreme Court of Ohio, Land Commissioner of the United States, and
Postmaster General of the United States (Brickner 2011). Throughout his many years of
service, McLean was regarded highly among leaders and colleagues (Brickner 2011).
One of his most famous dissents was that in Dred Scott case joined in dissent only
by Justice Curtis (1857). The invariable conclusion of his opinion sets him apart as a
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civil rights actor during a divisive time in American history. Some note that this case
ultimately led to the Civil War. If this is true, Justice McLean’s dissent was surely a
rallying point for antislavery activists. Especially given the norms of the time, Justice
McLean was a progressive in his own right (Brickner 2011).
Although these justices are seldom discussed in history, they were both progressive
minds on the Court. Each led the charge on controversial opinions given the circumstances
of the world they were living in. For this reason, it is understandable that Justice Trimble
was replaced by an equally liberal mind in Justice McLean, despite the fact that their
liberal ideology were earned for different reasons.

4.6 Harry A. Blackmun and Stephen G. Breyer
Moving several decades forward to Rehnquist’s seventh natural court, and the final discussion of the five lowest ideological shifts in the Court, the vacancy to be filled was left by
Justice Harry A. Blackmun by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Once Justice Breyer assumed
the seat Justice Blackmun had occupied, the ideology of the Court shifted 0.00814 to the
right understandably so. Although Breyer is a liberal justice in his own right, Blackmun
held several progressive stances on a miriad of issues, often pioneering decisions on the
Court. Nonetheless, the seat Justice Breyer filled was liberal, and his dedication to liberal
ideology helped the Court retain its position relative to the median ideological score.
A champion for civil rights for women and racial minorities, Justice Blackmun has
made a name for himself as a progressive jurist and staunch member of the liberal bloc
of the Court. As a history major in college, Justice Blackmun realized the importance
of understanding systemic racism of the past and how it reared its ugly head in the
present (Hair 1979). Those evils of oppression done in the past must be rectified, and
the Supreme Court, in his eyes, had every reason to bring justice to unjust situations.
One example of his commitment to bringing change to oppressed groups in relation to
women’s rights is found in his dissent in Beal v. Doe. Here, the Court denied Medicaid
funding for therapeutic abortions, a decision Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed with.
His dissent was markedly biting:
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For the individual woman concerned, indigent and financially helpless . . .
the result is punitive and tragic. Implicit in the Court’s holdings is the condescension that she may go elsewhere for her abortion. I find that disingenuous
and alarming, almost reminiscent of: “Let them eat cake” (1977).
The message from this opinion was clear: women should have access to abortions and
the government should aid those poverty stricken and in need of assistance. He continued
his fight for the minorities as it related to oppressed individuals in the community. Those
at an economic disadvantaged were always favored by the jurist. And unsurprisingly, the
justice had much to say on racial discrimination.
A prime example of his desire to see civil rights as it relates to race protected by the
highest court in the land comes from his dissent in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke which states that “in order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race” (1978). Justice Blackmun desired the Court take a comprehensive look at the
individuals involved in the case so as to ensure that minority interests were advocated for
and protected at such a high level as the Supreme Court. In fact, the jurist encouraged
his colleagues to look at a situation through the eyes of the victim (Hair 1979).
Noting only a few of the many achievements of Justice Blackmun, his replacement,
Justice Breyer, retained much of the progressive ideology of his predecessor. Justice
Breyer’s judicial theory is characterized by Cass R. Sunstein as “active liberty”, that is
a theory which pursues democratic goals (2006). Before his tenure on the Court, Justice
Breyer was a Harvard Law professor specializing in administrative law. The fact that
he had little experience with constitutional law was quickly dispelled by his reactionary
attitude to colleagues of the Court such as Justice Antonin Scalia and his adherence to
original textualism (Sunstein 2006).
In 2006, Justice Breyer was the most democratic member of the Rehnquist Court,
upholding the most acts of Congress and making decisions that favored the actions of
the executive branch (Sunstein). To such a degree, Justice Breyer seems committed to
self-governance and submitted to legislative authority in siding with Congress on several
of the acts that came before the judiciary. One finds in the theory of active liberty
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an adherence to the right of the exercise of sovereign power. As Breyer perceived it,
the nature of the country was democratic that required government and individual alike
to act in the preservation of certain rights espoused by the founding documents. The
Rehnquist Court, he viewed, had pushed back the freedom and liberty established in the
Warren Court to such an extent that was not warranted by the Constitution (Sunstein
2006).
Of principal connection to ensuring the rights of citizens, specifically those most vulnerable to having their rights taken away, was affirmative action. Education is of utmost
importance to advancing a free society in Justice Breyer’s judicial philosophy. He wrote
in Grutter v. Bollinger that “some form of affirmative action” is “necessary to maintain
a well-functioning participatory democracy” (2003). Justice Breyer through this dissent
is showing that he sides with Justice Blackmun in issues of race: what the government
can do to protect the oppressed and underrepresented populations of society should be
done.
When it comes to federalism, Justice Breyer strongly opposed the Rehnquist Court as
it scaled back federal power in favor of states rights. One example of redistributing power
back to the states and limiting the power of Congress comes in the Court’s decision to
strike down the Violence Against Women Act, stating that it does not fall under the per
view of the Commerce Clause (Sunstein 2006). Here, Justice Breyer, from a pragmatic
stance, argues that Congress needs certain powers in order to preserve national initiatives.
Those public goods that serve the need of citizens should be uphold by the Court as
Congress legislates.
Undoubtedly taking on cases differing from those faced by Justice Blackmun, nonetheless, Justice Breyer persisted in liberal rulings. The decision making of both justices
serves to maintain a liberal standard, with Breyer negligibly pushing the Court to the
right. This could be due in part to the nature of the cases each justice faced, with Justice
Blackmun caught entrenched in civil rights battles that laid the groundwork for future
decisions by Justice Breyer. Either way, liberal ideology was maintained and a shift of
small magnitudes had no power in moving the Court one direction or the other.
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5 The Eight Highest
Perhaps the most telling of the data points are the eight highest ideological score shifts
of the natural court. The same variables will be examined in this chapter as the one
before. However, those justices who shifted the ideology of the Court most significantly
for the tenure of their first natural court are listed. Among this group are four chief
justices of which two were outgoing and two incoming. While this may seem to disprove
the hypothesis that courts are better marked by incoming justices than chief justices,
the overwhelming number of associate justices who served to shift the ideology of the
Court would suggest otherwise. As we will see, this phenomenon only bolsters the claim
in showing that with a short tenure, the incoming chief justices have had little time to
curry the Court towards their ideology. What is more telling of ideological behavior is
the vacancy and replacement model as new associate justices and chief justices move the
ideological score of the Court on which he serves.
A visualization of the ideological shift in these most drastically-changing courts is
found in Figure 1. Through the figure, one can see the intriguing divide between the
liberal shifts and conservative shifts. The five greatest ideological shifts brought the
Court closer to a liberal majority; the next five had the opposite ideological affect. While
the causes for this phenomenon may be extensive (i.e. the practice of judicial restraint
was usually more common among the conservative bloc than the liberal bloc), it does
note that no ideology was inherent in the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the data suggests that there is in fact a strong correlation between the
ideological shift incurred by a replacement to the bench and the subsequent ideological
score of the new natural court. The most junior justice of the Court plays a significant
role in affecting the ideology of the bench without the chief justice’s influence as leader
of the Court. Justices are independent of other influences and seem to stick to their
own judicial philosophy. In order to verify this hypothesis, the twenty-two justices whose
departure and replacement moved the Court most substantially are discussed as follows.
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Figure 1: Ideological Shifts among Replacement Justices

5.1 Fred Moore Vinson and Earl Warren
The most significant shift occurred in the Court when Chief Justice Fred Moore Vinson
was replaced by Chief Justice Earl Warren. An ideological shift of 0.38504 was produced
by the vacancy and subsequent filling which caused the Court to become noticeably more
liberal. In fact, all five of the five highest shifts of the Court pushed the Court to the left
ideologically. In the shift of 1953, a Republican president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, seems
to work against his party lines in nominating Warren to the Court. The first natural
court of Chief Justice Warren surely turned the tides towards a liberal-leaning agenda.
To understand the significance of the shift from Chief Justice Vinson to Chief Justice
Warren, one must first understand who Vinson was. Warren was a loyal civil servant,
serving the country before his tenure on the Court as a Congressman, lower court judge,
Cabinet member, and as head of the Offices of Economic Stabilization and War Mobilization and Reconversion during World War II (Frank 1954). His tenure on the Court,
however, lacked much luster. Chief Justice Vinson often gave opinion assignments to
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other members of the Court, writing only a small amount given the seniority that the
chief justice enjoys in assigning opinion writing. Rather, Chief Justice Vinson spoke
through his vote. In civil rights cases, the work of John Frank finds that the Chief Justice voted against the claimant right (1954). When the individual was arguing against
the needs of the government, Vinson would rule in favor of the government. This casted
him solidly in the conservative bloc of the Court along with colleagues Justices Jackson,
Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton (Frank 1954).
Of the few opinions he did write, they focused on race relations and freedom of speech
as they pertain to civil rights. These two areas of law give a rather complete picture of
the chief’s ideological standings and judicial philosophy. Two cases of importance arose
under the umbrella of race relations in which Chief Justice Vinson exercised his voice in
issuing the opinion of the Court. The first case, Shelley v. Kraemer, dealt with racial
restrictive covenants and their ability to be enforced (1948). The second was Sweatt v.
Pain that dealt with segregation at the University of Texas law school (1950). In each of
these cases, Vinson undermined segregation and moved constitutional law further toward
separate and unequal. His opinions in this matter were liberal in nature, but not nearly
as sweeping as his predecessors’ rulings. The Chief Justice, rather, made distinctions
from previous rulings of the Court to make for a slow and steady change.
On the topic of free speech, Chief Justice Vinson authored two significant opinions,
one for American Communications Association v. Douds the other for Dennis v. United
States (1950, 1951). Both of these cases spoke to the First Amendment rights of avowed
Communists. Douds upheld the Taft-Hartley Act which required union members to
participate in an anti-Communism pledge. Leaving some lose ends as to how future cases
should be decided by this standard, Dennis detailed more clearly how future Courts
would decided cases on Communism as it pertained to the imprisonment of Communist
leaders (Frank 1954). The result of these two cases was scaling back free speech to protect
the country from Communism and its leaders. Given this strong conservative stance on
free speech and only mildly liberal approach to race relations, it stands to reason that
Chief Justice Vinson was a member of the conservative bloc in his opinions and in his
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voting.
The vacancy left by Chief Justice Vinson was soon filled by Earl Warren, the former
Governor of California, nominated by President Eisenhower to the position. One would
think that a Republican president would nominate a conservative justice to the bench
to uphold his ideals. However, Chief Justice Warren strayed far from the ideas of his
predecessor and the man who nominated him. When asked what his worst decision as
president was, Eisenhower said it was nominating Warren to the bench (Schwartz 1997).
Thus dubbed a staunch liberal of the Court, the record of Chief Justice Warren speaks
for itself.
A landmark case coming from Chief Justice Warren’s tenure was getting his entire
court to vote unanimously in Brown v. Board of Education that reversed the separate
but equal doctrine (1954). This case effectively turned the tide for civil rights in America,
enforcing the law of the land and ending school segregation (Schwartz 1997). Interestingly
enough, the case had come before Vinson’s court first, but was decided after Vinson’s
death. The tides of history had been changed as Warren’s predecessor who have voted in
favor of constitutionally supported segregation (Schwartz 1997). Not only would the Chief
have voted against civil rights, but a fractured court would have prevailed, deadening the
impact the case would have had if Vinson’s side had gained the majority. Nonetheless,
Chief Warren and his unanimous decision persisted. From this case alone, it is clear
that the chief justices were diametrically opposed in ideology. Yet, more examples of the
ideology shift caused by Chief Justice Warren’s presence on the Court persist.
Another mark of liberal leaning was Chief Justice Warren’s rulings in criminal rights
cases. The Chief was instrumental in bringing this case up to the Court to be heard,
going so far as to instruct his law clerks to seek out a right to counsel case (Schwartz
1997). Two formative cases were brought to Chief Justice Warren’s Court that altered
the direction of criminal rights for years to come. Of great importance was his opinion
written for Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Here, Chief Justice Warren insisted that criminals
be made aware of their legal rights at the time of arrest, knowing that a serious criminal
activity required some representation (he had formally worked as a district attorney)
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(Schwartz 1997). Before deciding this case Gideon v. Wainwright had made its way up
to the highest court, and Chief Justice Warren was all too eager to hear the case (1963).
Setting a precedent for the Miranda opinion, this case guaranteed a right to counsel for
those accused of criminal activity as protected under the Sixth Amendment.
When Chief Justice Vinson took conservative stances to civil rights cases, the basis for
most of the decision making in this model, Chief Justice Warren took the opposite stance.
So distinctly did the chief justices see issues, that Brown v. Board of Education could
have had a much different outcome, and, consequently, the separate but equal doctrine.
Clearly, Chief Justice Vinson and Chief Justice Warren were seemingly polar opposite
jurists, leading to a dramatic shift in the ideology of the Supreme Court once Vinson
departed and Warren was nominated and confirmed. There exists no better example of
a justice altering the trajectory of the Court than that which exists between Vinson and
Warren. What follows are examples of justices who shifted the ideology of the Court, but
not as significantly as Warren did in his first natural court.

5.2 Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Anthony M. Kennedy
The second largest shift in the Court came when Justice Anthony M. Kennedy replaced
Justice Lewis F. Powell on the bench. A 0.26037 shift occurred on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s second natural court as Justice Kennedy filled Powell’s vacant seat. Like the
example of Vinson and Warren, the nominating presidents would suggest that Powell
and Kennedy would have similar ideologies. But as the ideological shift score shows, Justice Kennedy pulled the Court farther to the left, one could only assume to the dismay
of President Reagan who nominated him.
Justices Lewis Powell, nominated to the Court by President Nixon, was noted by one
scholar as a “pragmatic relativist” which made him a swing vote in many cases before
the Court (Klafter 1998). Before his tenure on the Court, he served on Virginia’s State
Board of Education, working to desegregate schools slowly in his state in direct response
to the Brown ruling. In the rights of the criminally accused, he lamented as American
Bar Association president that the rights of criminals was becoming excessive, yet helped
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to create the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program for funds to provide
legal assistance to the poor (Klafter 1998). This non-conforming ideology makes clear
why some would mark him as a pragmatist and earned him the spot as a swing justice.
Once on the Court, not much changed in his ideology. Reluctant at first to join
the Court, President Nixon finally nominated Powell in October of 1971 and was confirmed within two months (Klafter 1998). A considerable opinion regarding the Fourth
Amendment was given to Powell early in his tenure: United States v. United States District Court (1972). The statements by the jurist in his opinion clarified unreasonable
searches, fair trials, and cruel and unusual punishment as defined in the Fourth Amendment. When the police wiretapped without a search warrant three people suspected of
conspiracy against the government, the question of the executive’s authority in domestic
security was raised to the Court. Justice Powell argued that “[slecurity surveillances are
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept,
the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation
to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent” (1972). Even in cases involving conspiracy against the government, officials needed to obtain proper warrants before
conducting surveillance. Here, Justice Powell stood for the protection of citizens against
the government, expanding rights of the accused as detailed in the Fourth Amendment
and making his vote with the liberal bloc. Similarly, Justice Powell was the swing vote
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, a case holding that warrantless search of an automobile without probable cause denies citizens their Fourth Amendment rights (1973). It
was not until Oliver v. United States that Powell ruled against the criminally accused,
upholding the open fields doctrine (1984).
On the topic of race, one of Justice Powell’s greatest opinions was in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke (1987). In his opinion, he split the finding for affirmative action policy where four justices voted that it had violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and four voted that the policy was constitutional. Truly, the swing justice earned
his name, but toed the line on this case arguing that racial quotas did in fact violate the
Equal Protection Clause, but that the university had a right to make race an admission
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criteria. Bakke, the petitioner, was admitted into the school and the University of California could maintain their affirmative action policy. There is no set ideological principle
here since Justice Powell joined both sides of the Court. However, in remembering his
actions with desegregating schools in Virginia, it seems that he sympathised with the
liberal bloc of the Court while acknowledging a slow process needed to occur to ensure
every citizen’s concerns were met.
Replacing Justice Powell after his long tenure on the Court was Justice Anthony
Kennedy, lauded by the president who nominated him as “a true conservative” (Jelliff
2013). Heralding from California, the justice served with Ronald Reagan while he was
governor of California, a connection that landed him on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and later, as a justice on the Supreme Court (Jelliff 2013).
While serving on the Court of Appeals, he had earned a spot as a staunch conservative
judge. However, as Anne Jelliff discusses in her analysis of Justice Kennedy, his judicial
philosophy is better described as “a moral reading of the Constitution” (2013). Under this
pretense, the votes of the swing justice come into clearer view, although his ideological
stance on the Court sat most usually in the liberal bloc. Because he voted liberally more
often, the Court experienced a significant shift upon his rise to the bench. A thorough
analysis of his voting and opinions while there is required to understand the difference
between this swing justice and his predecessor.
Justice Kennedy believed in a dichotomy between Constitutional power and a higher
moral authority that must be subjected to. Reading the Constitution from a textualist
or originalist standpoint does not allow for the righting of wrongs done to vulnerable
communities. He states, “whether or not liberty extends to situations not previously
addressed by the courts, to protections not previously announced by the courts” are the
primary elements of consideration for a justice (Jelliff 2013). This principle follows closely
with the teachings of the Catholic Church, according to Jelliff’s analysis, and informed
many of Justice Kennedy’s decisions.
In cases concerning religious liberty, Justice Kennedy voted in favor of allowing religious groups to express their beliefs on government property, and that the government
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should support the expression of religion. However, he also noted that coercion should be
avoided by the government, instead promoting religion broadly and taking into consideration the irreligious. His opinion for the case Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens embodies succinctly the Justice’s judicial philosophy in such cases
(1990). In the opinion he states that offering equal access to school facilities after hours
to groups of religious standing would not establish religion in such a manner that violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy argues that
a governmental response in this way would maintain neutrality of the public sphere and
protect the religious freedoms of citizens, one of the utmost priorities of the government.
While these examples could place him in the conservative bloc, there were several
instances where Justice Kennedy invariably voted with the liberal bloc. Take for example Obergefell v. Hodges where Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in which
he promoted LGBTQ rights and marriage equality. Years before, Justice Kennedy had
earned his reputation as a gay and lesbian rights advocate in Windsor v. United States
and Lawrence v. Texas. Kennedy was at the forefront of the gay rights crusade, decriminalizing sodomy and speaking for the Court through these three monumental decisions.
Beyond gay rights, Justice Kennedy advocated for equal protection among other
marginalized groups. In the case Texas Department of Housing v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., Kennedy wrote the majority opinion siding with the liberal bloc. This case
focused on racial equality and struck down a Texas law that proved the disparate income
theory. Texas tax credits had placed low income housing in center-city areas rather than
spreading housing across the city and surrounding suburbs. Justice Kennedy argued
that this effectively caused greater racial segregation as low income housing was built in
established black neighborhoods and kept out of white neighborhoods. Clearly, Justice
Kennedy was more sensitive to social justice issues and establishing rights for marginalized communities, creating a large disparity in ideological score between his predecessor
Justice Powell and himself.
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5.3 Horace Gray and Oliver Wendell Holmes
The next largest ideological shift of the Court occurred during the ninth natural court
of Chief Justice Fuller. In this year, Justices Horace Gray and George Shiras, Jr. were
replaced by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and William Rufus Day, respectively. The
replacement caused a 0.24805 liberal shift of the Court. Once again, the nominating
president for the replacement justices was a Republican, which could have made the
the replacement against the ideological interest of the commander in chief. But given
Theodore Roosevelt’s progressive agenda, the justices accomplished his prerogative. Of
lasting affect was Justice Holmes whose tenure on the Court brought about great legal
change.
The first pair, Justice Horace Gray and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, contributed
most significantly to the shift of ideology. Justice Gray has been characterized as an avid
state’s rights enthusiast in his judicial philosophy (Davis 1955). Appointed to the Court
by President Arthur in 1881, Gray served for twenty-one years. Following his tenure
at Harvard Law School, Justice Gray was a Reporter for the state of Massachusetts
Supreme Court and carried on his own private practice (Davis 1955). His service to the
state court made him a viable candidate to serve on the court where he developed his
judicial philosophy. Justice Gray became a Republican shortly before the Civil War, yet
preserved his conservative spirit in political matters (Davis 1955).
Once on the Supreme Court, Justice Gray was found to adhere strongly to his conservative values. At this time of the Court, many cases dealt with state’s rights and
sovereignty. In a string of cases on the matter, Justice Gray stood firmly to his strict
interpretation of the Constitution and relegating power to Congress. Two cases Julliard
v. Greenman (1884) and United States v. Lee (1882) best summarize his philosophy
as a nationalist. Through his dissent in Lee, Gray stated that the claim to Robert E.
Lee’s estate fought for between Lee’s family and the United States was better suited
to be rectified in the legislative or executive rather than the judiciary. In the majority
opinion for Julliard, Justice Gray again ceded power from the Court to the legislature.
He notes, “If, upon a just and fair interpretation of the whole constitution, a particular
34

power of authority appears to be vested in congress, it is no constitutional objection to
its existence, or to its exercise, that the property or the contracts of individuals may be
incidentally affected” (1884). The judiciary must fall to Congressional authority, especially following the many cases that arose from legislation passed during the Civil War. It
was inappropriate, according to Gray, for the Supreme Court to take any power from the
executive and legislative branches. Such examples point to the conservative tendencies
he had on the Court.
His predecessor, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, took quite the opposite approach
to the bench. An appointee of President Theodore Roosevelt, this justice was notably
progressive. According to Ellis Washington, Justice Holmes was one of the greatest
progressives on the bench, altering the course of the Supreme Court for generations
(2017). The judicial philosophy of Holmes is further characterized as follows:
During his tenure on the Supreme Court, Holmes systematically reinforced
policies for government control of economic regulation, and he supported an
expansive, new interpretation of freedom of speech under the First Amendment. These judicial views, in addition to his idiosyncratic temperament
and writing bravura, endeared him to supporters of progressive politics and
socialist jurisprudence, notwithstanding Holmes’ profound skepticism of and
disagreement with progressive politics. His evolution-atheism and progressive
jurisprudence defined the Progressive Age while transforming American jurisprudence. His views influenced much of American legal thinking covering
the first half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, The Journal of Legal
Studies acknowledges Holmes as one of the three most cited American legal
scholars of the twentieth century (Washington 2017).
Given the enduring nature of Holmes’ judicial philosophy, it is no wonder that the justice
had the most influence on the ideological shift during this natural court.
Specific examples of Justice Holmes’ philosophy are evident in cases decided on more
traditional cases on government regulation as well as social issues. In the Lochner dissent,
Justice Holmes created the modern understanding of federalism, putting an end to “eco35

nomic and social experimentation by the states” (Washington 2017). As it relates to free
speech, the justice also deviated from historical understanding of the First Amendment
and formed new tests to “check” the powers allotted to individuals. The opinions for the
cases Schenk, Abrams, and Gitlow created the “clear and present danger” test and the
“marketplace of ideas” concept to expand speech allowed through the amendment of the
Constitution. Just in these few examples is it clear that Holmes had a liberal judicial
philosophy and exercised it freely while on the bench.

5.4 George Shiras, Jr. and William Rufus Day
Still affecting the ideological shift of the ninth natural court under Fuller was the replacement of Justice George Shiras, Jr. with Justice William Rufus Day. Justice Shiras was
appointed to the Court by President Harrison and served for eleven years on the Court
(Frank 1941). Hailing from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, George Shiras, Jr., was a man of
integrity. Before taking his seat on the Supreme Court, Shiras worked as an attorney in
Pennsylvania, turning down opportunities from many to become a United States Senator,
citing as the basis for his refusal, saying “he would not become a pawn in local Republican politics” (Hudspeth 2003). As scholar J.P. Frank notes, Justice Shiras had little
influence on the Court except for his dealings with income tax litigation. Nevertheless,
he did have some influence on economic regulation, making him a conservative justice.
Scholar Harvey Hudspeth denotes the problem of the vacillating justice in the income
tax case of 1895 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (2003). In this case, the Court
was posed with a question of constitutionality for an income tax levied during peace time.
Justice Howell Jackson, at the time suffering from tuberculosis, was unable to hear the
case the first time. The Court was tied four to four. The justice recovered temporarily,
hearing the case and voting to uphold the tax. But, the case was voted against five to
four, meaning one justice had switched from supporting the tax to calling for its demise.
According to Hudspeth, the culprit was Justice Shiras (2003). Newspapers following the
Supreme Court decisions reported Justice Shiras as the swing justice responsible for the
demise of the federal income tax.
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The majority opinion in Pollock argued that
So far as it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property; being
a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation, all
these sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid (1895).
Whether or not Justice Shiras had been the “vacillating justice” as Hudspeth describes
is unclear. But what is clear is that the majority, which Justice Shiras had signed onto,
had taken a stance to roll back federal power and return some authority to the states.
This solidifies Justice Shiras’ conservative leaning despite his small voice on the Court.
Replacing Justice George Shiras, Jr., was another President Theodore Roosevelt appointee, Justice William Rufus Day. Unique to Justice Day as his reluctance to dissent,
often wishing to be in the majority opinion (Bair 2015). The scholar Bair attributes this
attitude as indicative of his sometimes erratic behavior, although the justice did seem
to find his camp in the liberal bloc of the Court. Not nearly as progressive as Justice
Holmes, Justice Day still found a name for himself as a liberal-leaning justice.
There were several opinions which Justice Day signed onto solidify the analysis that he
was a liberal justice, turning the seat Justice Shiras had left him. One such majority was
Lochner v. New York by which the Supreme Court struck down a New York state statute
that regulated maximum hours for bankers. Another case, Coppage v. Kansas, Justice
Day wrote a dissent separate from the extreme progressive, Justice Holmes, arguing
that the right of contract “is not absolute and unyielding” (Bair 2015). Yet another
example of Day’s ideas on federalism is found in Hammer v. Dagenhart where he wrote
the majority opinion to strike down federal labor legislation. He believed that Congress
had overstepped its commerce clause powers and could not federally mandate working
conditions across states. From these examples, it is clear that Justice Day was a decided
swing vote, although he most regularly sided with the liberal bloc of the Court. The
fact that few scholars have analyzed his tenure on the Court serves to show that Justice
Holmes was the greatest contributor to the liberal swing of this natural court. While
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Justice Day would sometimes vote in tandem with the justice appointed to the bench
within the same year as him, he was not a guaranteed vote. His judicial philosophy
regarding federalism and federal power most clearly demonstrates this reality.

5.5 William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes
Again, another pair appointed and confirmed to the Court in tandem proves to be a
significant liberal shift of the Court, resulting in a 0.24689 point change. The justices
leaving the Court were Chief Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Edward Terry
Sanford replaced by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Josephus
Roberts, respectively. Interestingly enough, a new chief justice to the Supreme Court
made this ideological shift present in the first natural court under Chief Justice Hughes.
Given the gravity of the seat shift between Chief Justices Taft and Hughes, the majority
of attention will focus in the next two sections will focus on them.
First explored is the difference in judicial philosophy between Chief Justices Taft and
Hughes. In the “Five Lowest” chapter of this thesis, section four, the tenure and philosophy of Chief Justice Taft was explored as he replaced Chief Justice Edward Douglass
White. For further information on the conservative chief, that section can be reviewed.
Proceeding Taft was Chief Justice Hughes, an appointee of President Hoover. Taking
the bench in February of 1930, Chief Justice Hughes was met with a mounting economic
crisis as the United States faced the Great Depression. Unlike Taft, Hughes was much
further disposed to liberalism, especially given the circumstance of the country and the
massive amount of legislation created through the New Deal (Hendel 1957). As a biographer of Hughes’ life and judicial philosophy states
One of the most striking characteristics of Hughes’ work on the bench was his
high degree of objectivity .... He was an openminded [sic] judge .... In a large
measure Hughes succeeded in freeing his judicial reasoning from any social or
economic pattern .... The human mind does not operate independently of its
experience. But Hughes’ basic intellectual loyalty was to the idea of justice
itself.... For him justice was not a means to an end; it was the end.
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Chief Justice Hughes was revered by many for his intellectual integrity while serving on
the highest court, making it difficult to pin-down the chief. However, Hendel notes that
Chief Justice Hughes often took liberal stances in civil rights and liberties cases, making
him pointedly different from his predecessor.
Before coming to the Court, Hughes had served in a myriad of public offices including
running for president with the Republican Party against Wilson in 1916 and Secretary
of State for four years (Hendel 1957). As the Governor of New York and work as an
Associate Justice to the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916, Chief Justice Hughes earned
his reputation as a liberal.
A notable insight to his social leanings as a liberal were his decisions affecting Communists. Chief Justice Hughes argued that the protections of the First Amendment guarded
Communist sympathizers to speak freely, assembly peaceably, and exercise their freedoms. Institutions were not to take away anyone’s claim to these rights (Hendel 1957).
In regards to civil rights, Chief Justice Hughes wrote a majority opinion stating that black
individuals had equal protection under the law to receive legal education and furnished
facilities comparable to their white counterparts (Hendel 1957). Furthermore, he joined
the majority to strike down a law in Oklahoma which barred blacks the right to vote.
Unlike Chief Justice Taft, Hughes took many opportunities to join the liberal bloc of the
Court, shifting the ideological score of the seat to reflect his judicial philosophy.

5.6 Edward Terry Sanford and Owen Josephus Roberts
Also coming to replace a justice on the Court during the fist natural court under Hughes
was Owen Josephus Roberts taking the seat of Justice Edward Terry Sanford. Justice
Sanford hailed from Knoxville, Tennessee, born into the South at the end of the Civil
War. His parents had migrated from Connecticut before his birth which made Sanford a
northern sympathizer. Leader of the Republican party in Tennessee, Sanford was involved
in public service before being elevated to the Supreme Court.
President Harding was responsible for appointing then-Judge Sanford to the Court
where he wrote opinions dealing with technical and procedural matters rather than cases
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of high profile. His most famous opinion was in Okanogan Indians v. United States where
he upheld the right of the president to use a pocket veto (Scheb 2016).
While his specialty often laid within mundane cases, Justice Sanford also contributed
substantially to First Amendment cases. He wrote the majority opinion for the Court in
Gitlow v. New York, Whitney v. California, and Fiske v. Kansas. The first two cases
dealt with Communist individuals. Citing the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Sanford
effectively incorporated more the freedom of speech and of the press to the states. The
third case Whitney dealt with Industrial Workers of the World and membership into the
group. A portion of Sanford’s opinion for the case is as follows:
the Syndicalism Act has been applied in this case to sustain the conviction of
the defendant without any charge or evidence that the organization in which
he secured members advocated any crime, violence or other unlawful acts or
methods as a means of effecting industrial or political changes or revolution.
Thus applied, the Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police
power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant
(1927).
Here, Justice Sanford protected nonviolent speech without outright striking down laws
that had previously criminalized some speech, especially that relating to communism.
Justice Sanford was a markedly liberal-leaning justice, making his small contribution to
the Court.
Justice Sanford was replaced by Justice Owen Josephus Roberts whose tenure on
the Court was marked by the infamous switch in time that saved nine. Justice Roberts
had grown up in Philadelphia and stayed there through most of his professional career,
working in the district attorney’s office (Solomon 2009). When Roberts eventually joined
the Supreme Court, his presence was flew in the face of the rather balanced Court made
up of four unbending conservatives and four reliable liberals. Like his predecessor, Justice
Roberts was often hinged on the nuts and bolts of a case. For instance, his first majority
opinion for the Court “hinged on the meaning of ‘of’” (Solomon 2009). This Hoover
appointee did not take a major role in the Supreme Court until Nebbia v. New York
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(1934).
In this case, Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion of the Court, taking a mighty
blow to the four conservatives. He argued that property rights and contract rights were
not absolute. Rather, the liberal stated, “government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest” (1934). But his liberal streak did not last. Until
1937, Justice Roberts sided with the conservatives of the Court who struck down much
of the legislation of the New Deal. Then, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court
had changed to ruling in favor of government regulation, all thanks to Roberts’ switch to
the liberal bloc. His liberalism continued throughout the remainder of his tenure, thus
adding to the liberal shift of the first natural court under Chief Justice Hughes, although
not as greatly as his chief.

5.7 John McLean and Noah Haynes Swayne
The fifth highest shift and final liberal shift of the Court within the ten highest ideological
shifts occurred in the twelfth natural court under Taney. Justice John McLean was
replaced by Noah Haynes Swayne, resulting in a 0.24457 point shift of the Court. The
life and judicial tenure of Justice McLean has been detailed in section five of the previous
chapter, so the tenure of Justice Swayne will be the focus here.
Justice McLean as discussed previously was a quite progressive on the Court. But
Justice Swayne in the era of Reconstruction, had turned the seat to become even more
liberal. Appointed to the bench by President Lincoln, Justice Swayne had proved his
dedication and service to expanding civil rights to marginalized individuals while riding
circuit. In U.S. v. Rhodes, Justice Swayne upheld the Civil Rights Act, protecting the
rights of all citizens within the country (Kato 2015). Although the Supreme Court was
more hesitant to tie the federal government to this standard, Justice Swayne proved his
liberalism in other avenues of civil rights.
The case ex parte Milligan allowed Justice Swayne to show his support for part of
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the Reconstruction efforts. It is true that the use of military trials during the Civil War
were struck down by the Court; nevertheless, Justice Swayne joined a concurrence by the
Court stating that Congress indeed had greater power in times of public danger:
We cannot doubt that, in such a time of public danger, Congress had power,
under the Constitution, to provide for the organization of a military commission, and for trial by that commission of persons engaged in this conspiracy.
The fact that the Federal courts were open was regarded by Congress as a
sufficient reason for not exercising the power; but the fact could not deprive
Congress of the right to exercise it. Those courts might be open and undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert
threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate promptitude and certainty,
the guilty conspirators (1866).
The practice of emergency powers was enlarged by the Court to the benefit of Congress
all in the name of ending racial violence. And again, the judicial philosophy of Swayne is
detailed in the Slaughter-House Cases. The majority upheld the Louisiana statute that
increased government regulation and would eventually be used in reading the due process
clause (Kato 2015). Justice Swayne had essentially turned an already progressive seat
into a guaranteed victory for the liberal bloc of the Court. Thus concludes the liberal
shifts of the Court.

5.8 Nathan Clifford and Horace Gray
The remainder of the ideological shifts of the Court center around conservative changes.
The next two sections follow the movement during the fourth natural court under Chief
Justice Waite. Two appointees by President Arthur incurred a -0.21538 point shift in the
Court.
The first pair, Justice Nathan Clifford replaced by Justice Horace Gray, offer little
understanding in just how the Court was shifted. Justice Clifford was born in New
Hampshire, coming from almost nothing. He did not attend college, but studied on his
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own in accordance with the curriculum of Dartmouth College, eventually entering into
the tutelage of a prominent lawyer nearby (Chandler 1925). He entered into political
life running as a Democrat and earned his first place in the Maine Legislature (Chandler
1925). As U.S. Attorney General, Clifford became acquainted with the Supreme Court
and, in 1858, was appointed to the Court by President Buchanan. Given his measly
beginnings, it is a testament to his work ethic and drive that he was able to rise to the
Supreme Court as an associate justice.
Justice Clifford was privy to the Court for twenty-three years during some of the most
trying times. As the scholar Chandler assesses of Clifford’s judicial philosophy, the man
was a northern who adhered to Jeffersonian principles.
An analysis of these decisions shows the influence of Judge Clifford with his
associates whose party affiliations were different from his. The majority opinions maintained a wise balance between national and state sovereignty, and
witness his judicial strength and his sympathy with southern political principles (1925).
The justice was conservative in his philosophy, determined to preserve certain principles
of Jeffersonian politics.
As noted earlier in section three of this chapter, Justice Horace Gray was a staunch
conservative, upholding state’s rights and arguing for less federal involvement. Additionally, he took on a view of the judiciary that called for submission to legislative and
executive power. The invariable conservatism of both justices suggest that only through a
furtherance of conservative principles by Justice Gray could the replacement have shifted
the Court even further to the right.

5.9 Ward Hunt and Samuel Blatchford
The subsequent pair of justices from the shift causing the fourth natural court of Waite
was Justice Ward Hunt replaced by Justice Samuel Blatchford. Justice Hunt was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Grant. Born in Utica, New York, he studied
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law at Union College, afterwards working for a local judge with who he started a successful partnership (Ward). Like many other justices, Ward Hunt became active in politics
where he served in the New York State Assembly and as major of Utica. During this
time, Justice Ward ran as a Jacksonian Democrat; however, the antislavery Free Soil
ticket eventually gained his support and he departed from his party’s social teaching.
Later, Justice Ward would be instrumental in founding the Republican Party in New
York (Ward). Little is known of the justices tenure on the Supreme Court mainly due to
the lack of work assigned to him. After serving only six years, the justice suffered a stroke
and his duties were further minimized. Ironically it took a passage of law by Congress
to lower the requirements to receive a pension for Justice Ward to be persuaded to step
down and relinquish his seat to the next judicial mind.
Justice Ward’s replacement was Justice Samuel Blatchford. Still few things are known
about Justice Blatchford, be it only fitting that an unassuming and largely unknown
justice be succeeded by and equally unknown jurist. He too heralded from New York,
coming from a family of great wealth, although he seldom made that fact public. Before
rising to the Supreme Court, he worked for the governor of New York and as a counselor
of the state supreme court (Justice Blatchford 1893). The writer of a newspaper article
summarizing the life of the associate justice states that Justice Blatchford was deeply
committed to upholding his office and duty to the Constitution, even denying a request
by the government to remove a libel case to Washington (Justice Blatchford 1893). While
it is unclear how these two pairs of justices differed significantly, it can be presumed
from the great conservative name Justice Gray made for himself on the Court that he
contributed most to the ideological shift.

5.10 Robert Houghwout Jackson and John Marshall Harlan II
The seventh highest ideological shift of the Court came from Justice John Marshall Harlan
II replacing Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson on the bench. This caused a -0.21267
point conservative shift of the Court during the second natural court under Chief Justice
Warren. A more modern example of justices causing great shift in the Court moves
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away from the Civil War Era and Reconstruction to a time of mounting cases defining
civil rights and liberties. It is interesting that the greatest conservative shifts of the
Court centered around changing attitudes about federal government involvement, most
commonly in the arena of civil rights.
Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson was a man of great style and grandeur (Jaffe 1955).
His philosophy was marked by scorn for judicial caution and a flamboyant attitude that
made his presence to his colleagues on the bench. Most notably and informative of
Justice Jackson’s attitude toward the law was his understanding of federalism. Despising
partisan politics, the justice strove to elevate the status of the judiciary, going so far as to
write a book entitled The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy while serving as the Attorney
General (Jaffe 1955). This accomplishment invariably sets the stage for his passion for
the expansion of the judiciary and federal power over the states.
A supporter of the New Deal and President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointee, Justice
Jackson made his first move of declaring his ideas concerning federalism in the case
Duckworth v. Arkansas. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson notes that the Court
had neglected to hold Congress accountable to the responsibility it had through the
Constitution.
Because the Court elected in this almost ostentatious manner to insist on the
routine character of its judgment, Jackson chose to treat it as a gratuitous
distortion of the commerce clause. Why, he asks in his concurring opinion,
does the Court spurn the use of the twenty-first amendment, specifically devised to deal with the liquor traffic?... He then indicates that the Court has
the prime responsibility of maintaining the freedom of that national economy
which was the principal object of the Constitution (Jaffe 1955).
It was the duty of the Court and the prerogative of Congress to allow for free commercial
movement. Justice Jackson notes that the majority opinion allows states and localities
to manipulate commerce in a way that violates the duties of the state. Further cases
hold similar sentiment in judicial philosophy for which Justice Jackson argued. Another
example was State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich in which Justice Jackson stated that the
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chaos created through certain federalism teachings only limits the duties of Congress.
Thus, Justice Jackson was a loud advocate for greater nationalization and Congressional
grabs for the power that rightfully belonged to them.
In the place of this liberal federalist calling for greater federal power rose Justice John
Marshall Harlan II. He was known as a great dissenter with intelligence and principle,
usually writing opinions counter to the majority (Dorsen 1991). An appointee by President Eisenhower, Justice Harlan proved himself as a true conservative on the Court,
unlike the chief and Eisenhower appointee Earl Warren.
Justice Harlan opposed “egalitarian rulings of many kinds”, being especially weary of
equality doctrines ill established by the Court (Dorsen 1991). Indicative of his opinion
of the Court’s power encroachment were his dissents in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds
v. Sims. Both cases dealt with reapportionment and manipulated some state’s rights
in the name of equality. While serving on the Court, Justice Harlan also witnessed a
massive reform of criminal procedure. He dissented vigorously from the exclusionary rule
to illegally seized evidence, “Miranda” rules, and requirement of trial by jury (Dorsen
1991). The idea of incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states was equally opposed by
the justice who believed “that a ‘healthy federalism’ was inconsistent with the assertion
of national judicial authority” (Dorsen 1991). In essence, most of the civil rights cases
coming from the Warren Court lacked any support from the conservative justice.
Justice Harlan’s objections to these cases and more came from his understanding
of federalism as explained in the Constitution. Additionally, he understood Congress
as having final authority in government. To him, this meant that Congress had the
right to impair civil liberties, making his opinion known in cases concerning citizenship.
Compared to his predecessor, Justice Harlan was strictly conservative, particularly with
respect to issues of federalism. Here marked a massive conservative swing in the Court
from two justices opposed on almost every judicial philosophy regarding federalism.
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5.11 Joseph P. Bradley and George Shiras, Jr.
The final ideological shift of the Court examined in this thesis is the replacement of Justices Joseph P. Bradley and Lucius Quintus C. Lamar with Justices George Shiras, Jr.,
and Howell Edmund Jackson, respectively. Like so many of the previous shifts of the
Court, the fourth natural court under Chief Justice Fuller was subject to two replacements. While those who replaced sitting justices were of little significance in the tenure
of the Court, nevertheless, their influence on economic regulation created a conservative
shift in the Court of a magnitude of 0.20145 points.
To begin, the pair of Justices Bradley and Shiras will be examined. Justice Joseph P.
Bradley was born in New York and raised in the mountains upstate. The justice practiced
law in Newark and was appointed to the Supreme Court by Grant following the end of
the Civil War where he served for over twenty years. He was a strong nationalist and best
remembered for the role he played in the future of race relations in the U.S. (Champagne
1985). The justice’s love for learning and attention to detail made him a fantastic jurist
(Champagne 1985).
In further regards to his judicial philosophy, the justice is known for his opinion in
Civil Rights Cases which struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as unconstitutional.
His opinion is summarized as follows:
He determined in the Civil Rights Cases that discrimination based on race,
such as refusal of inn service, was not a badge of slavery. He also determined
that such discrimination was a function of private rather than state action.
As a result, Bradley could not find the authority for the law in the 13th or
14th amendments (Champagne 1985).
Justice Bradley’s opinion drew criticism from his colleagues who believed the ruling was
too narrow. In Bradwell v. State the justice ruled against civil rights, stating that women
could be refused admission to the bar based on sex. While this case may seem to place
the justice rather far to the right, given the period in which he was ruling, this opinion
is not out of the ordinary. Nevertheless, Justice Bradley was subject to a rigid form of
thinking.
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The tenure of Justice George Shiras, Jr. has already been detailed in length in the
fourth section of “The Eight Highest.” Any refresher as to the nature of the justice’s
judicial philosophy can be found there. Given his conservative tendencies in spite of his
predecessor’s somewhat judicial philosophy, it is no wonder that the Court experienced
a conservative shift with the appointment of Justice Shiras to the bench.

5.12 Lucius Quintus C. Lamar and Howell Edmund Jackson
The second pair of outgoing and incoming justices to the Supreme Court during the fourth
natural court under Chief Justice Fuller was Justice Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar
and Justice Howell Edmund Jackson. The conservative shift of the Court given these
two pairs of justices is of significance here given Justice Lamar’s background and tenure
on the Court. Appointed by Democratic President Cleveland twenty years following the
Civil War, Justice Lamar had served as a Confederate officer during the war much to
the chagrin of Senate Republicans (Frank 1941). The confirmation of this Mississippi
Congressman was met with great animosity and sitting senators took many forms of
attacks of his character to stop his rise to the Court. He succeeded in confirmation with
two Republicans voting for his confirmation, and thus began his time in service on the
Supreme Court.
While there, this secessionist helped to push the Court to the separate but equal
doctrine (2005). A staunch believer in states rights, Justice Lamar advocated for conservative values and influenced the Court to adopt conservative stances to the law. This
was most prominent in cases dealing with racial segregation. In Louisville, New Orleans
and Texas Railway Company v. Mississippi, the justice voted with the majority that
“Congress had no right to interfere with the racial segregation of public transportation
for instrastate rail travel in Mississippi” (2005). Essentially, the justice ruled that the
rights of the states outweighed the rights of the individual and due process should not
be forceably incorporated at the state level. Justice Lucius Q. C. Lamar died and was
replaced before the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, but it is no secret that Louisville served
as significant precedent for the separate but equal doctrine. The Southern Democrat had
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influenced the Court towards traditionally conservative ideological standings as he ruled
in favor of limiting the scope of the federal government even at the expense of limiting
the rights of individuals.
The successor to Justice Lamar, Justice Edmund Howell Jackson, was a man of little
renown on the Court. According to J.P. Frank, his measly service of two years on the
Court left little impact (1941). While serving, he limited the scope of his influence to
cases on income tax litigation. The justice’s lack of impact on the Court meant that little
was done to affect the change instituted by Justice Lamar as he had served.
One scholar, Harvey Gresham Hudspeth, notes the life and career of Justice Howell
Jackson as the first Tennessean to reside on the Court (1999). A Southern Democrat,
his nomination to the bench by President Harrison was a strategic move to quell the
Southern Democratic senators ready to quash any Republican nominees to the Court.
Former colleagues of the justice, Justice Brown of the Sixth Circuit Court and Republican
Senator George Hoar advocated for the quick confirmation of the nominee before Harrison
left office (Hudspeth 1999). Then-Judge Jackson was of a beneficial choice to Republicans
as well because he expanded the Civil Rights Act of 1870 in the case United States v.
Patrick (Hudspeth 1999).
Once on the Court, the sickly Tennessean had almost no cases of significance. Some
have glossed over his tenure on the Court as one historian, C. Vann Woodward, marked
Justice Lamar’s replacement as Justice Edward D. White (Hudspeth 1999). One Supreme
Court case, Lascalles v. Georgia, proved to show that the ruling Jackson had made in
Patrick was not an accident. He reaffirmed his prior decision and called for a reduction
in states rights as territories without the power of a nation. Dying only a year before
Plessy, his final appeal to the Court is unknown, although one would suspect he would
have ruled with the majority (Hudspeth 1999). The greater liberality socially of the
justice proceeding Justice Lamar might seem to have outweighed the work of Lamar.
The more liberal ideological stance of the justice also came from his dissent in the 1895
case Pollock v. Farmers’ Trust & Loan Co. where he believed the Court should have
upheld a federal income tax (Johnson 2007). Although Justice Jackson never had the
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Figure 2: Ideological Shifts across Natural Courts

opportunity while on the Court to show his influence as an anti-Anti-Trust justice, his
legacy on the lower court gave rise to decisions found by the Supreme Court to limit the
Sherman Act and dispense with some of the regulations established by the legislation
(Hudspeth 2002). However, Justice Jackson’s short tenure proved to affect the Court
minimally, except in his conservative understanding of the Sherman Act and economic
regulation, leaving in tact much of Justice Lamar’s influence on the bench.

6 Longevity of Natural Court and Ideological Shift
The final source of inquiry lied within the longevity of the natural court. Examining the
length of the Court’s tenure and the ideology of the Courts immediately preceding and
proceeding brought to attention the arc of a natural court. Specifically determined is the
direction of ideological change and an exploration of a few of the longest natural courts.
The Figure 2 outlines how the ideological shifts from one natural court to the next
spread in respect to the length of the Court. Given the normal distribution of the figure
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as the length of the natural increases, one can presume that the longevity of a natural
court does indeed affect the ideological shifts. The longer a natural court persists, it will
gravitate toward a median ideology. Those natural courts that persist for two years or less
would suggest that not enough cases are decided within that time period for ideological
shifts to define the Court. Within the two year period lie multiple outliers; yet, the
median remains below the three year median.
At the three year mark, the ideological shifts of the Court are significant. Unlike
natural courts of longer periods, the natural courts lasting three years shift dramatically
as justices are unable to reach a more stable median from one year to the next. Next,
in the four year marker, the data trends downward again. It seems that the length of
the Court becomes a factor in how great the ideological shift is during the natural court.
The downward trend of the median ideological shift trends downward again in the five
or more years courts, indicative again of a stabilizing natural court.
Before continuing with a discussion of a few of these natural courts and their personnel makeup, it is worth noting the break through in understanding of the Court this
data collection has achieved. Speculation about natural courts and longevity had circulated in previous study by political scientists, but these projections were often limited to
Marshall’s famous fourth natural court which lasted an unprecedented twelve years. It
has been understood that the long-serving chief justice was able to corral the Court into
making unanimous decisions and writing but one opinion for each case (Hobson 2006).
While this may explain the lack of ideological shift in Marshall’s fourth natural court,
it does not account for those chief justices who also enjoyed low ideological shift during
long natural courts.
Rather, a more appropriate understanding of the longevity of natural courts is to
expand upon the conclusions drawn in the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis. When
a natural court persists for several years, the low ideological shift can be attributed to the
fact that there were no new appointments to the bench. Logically, this makes sense as it
was shown in the preceding chapters how reactive the ideological score of the Court is to
replacement justices. Those replacement justices who differ greatly in judicial philosophy
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from their predecessors will incur a great ideological shift in the Court from one natural
court to the next. The opposite is true when a justice is similar in judicial philosophy to
his or her predecessor. And the findings in this chapter of research bolster the argument
made in previous chapters: that the better grasp on categorizing courts comes from the
most influential justice or justices rather than the chief justice.
In order to explore this finding, three of the longest natural courts which fall within the
five or more year category are further discussed in the proceeding sections. These three
courts include Chief Justice Marshall’s fourth natural court, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
seventh natural court, and Chief Justice Waite’s sixth natural court. All three of these
courts lasted eight years or more. For reference, the greatest ideological shift in a given
natural court was 0.24138 for Chief Justice Waite’s seventh natural court lasting only
two years, and the smallest was essentially zero, usually scoring for natural courts lasting
one year or less.
Marshall’s fourth natural court experienced a net -0.00545 ideological shift during
its twelve year tenure. At the time, the Court was composed of only six justices and a
majority of Federalists (Hobson 2006). Given the determination by Chief Justice John
Marshall to rally together his Court and offer unanimous opinions, such a small ideological
shift is expected. During this time period, the chief was greeted by devoted colleagues who
were energized by decisions like Marbury v. Madison that had solidified the trajectory of
the Court. The slight shifts in the ideological score can be explained by the temperamental
associate justice William Johnson of South Carolina (Hobson 2006). Without a coalition,
however, he had little power on the Court.
Some cases of note during this time were Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee and Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. Martin expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and Dartmouth invalidated state law in an effort to honor a contract
between the state of New Hampshire and Dartmouth College.
While much emphasis has been given to the study of Chief Justice John Marshall’s
natural courts, research is lacking in the study of other chiefs. The remaining natural
courts of interest, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seventh natural court and Chief Justice
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Waite’s sixth natural court, serve in expanding the evidence found through the data set
of the longevity of natural courts. With William H. Rehnquist’s court, a mere 0.00149
ideological shift took place over an eleven year period. The conservative chief often
deferred to the elected branches of government, creating a marked shift from the Warren
Court that had prevailed before (Giuffra 2006). Although not as focused on creating a
unified court, that had little bearings on the ideological shift as justices voted largely
independently and according to their judicial philosophy.
The sixth natural court under Chief Justice Morrison Waite had an ideological shift
of 0.05618 points and lasted 8 years. While much greater than both Chief Justices
Marshall and Rehnquist, the value still ranks significantly lower than the outlier of Chief
Justice John Roberts’ fourth natural court (the ideological shift was -0.07175) which
lasted for seven years, as well as natural courts lasting between two and four years.
Again, one follows the direction of the Chief Justice in understanding what influence
time had on stabilizing the ideological score of the natural court. According to the
scholar D. Stephenson, Jr., the Waite Era was not indicative of a “political or judicial
chieftain” (1973). Perhaps the distinction in score between Waite’s court and Marshall’s
and Rehnquist’s courts is that the chief had a less commanding and all together a less
impressive jurist (Stephenson 1973). Nonetheless, the hypothesis that personnel change
on the Court has more influence on ideological direction than the chief justice should not
be abandoned.
When exploring the ideological scores of the next five longest, the hypothesis becomes
even clearer. Chief Justice John Roberts’ fourth natural court lasted seven years and
shifted -0.07175 points. The first natural court of Chief Justice Chase lasted six years
and incurred an ideological shift one-tenth of Roberts’ court: 0.007175. Fuller’s eighth
and tenth natural courts both lasted six years and shifted -0.03223 and 0.06932 points,
respectively. And Chief Justice Taft’s fifth natural court lasted six years with a -0.00891
shift. Subsequent courts that lasted only six years managed to shift at an even less
significant amount. Therefore, it is reasonable to relate a long natural court to the
ideological shift of the Court. The longer the natural court persists, the less average

53

ideological shift will be incurred.

7 Concluding Remarks
The hypothesis this thesis sought to defend was thoroughly bolstered. Despite common
practice by Supreme Court scholars, the data found through this investigation point
to a different method of classifying the Court: that is, by the most influential justice
on the bench. What is more, the research from this study discovered information not
yet applied in the field of Supreme Court scholarship. In understanding natural court
longevity, observers are better able to make decisions on depoliticizing the Court and
making decision-making estimates once a natural court has been established.
As it relates to the greater body of political science research, these findings marry
well with the literature cited at the beginning of this thesis. The Segal-Cover score
proves the expected ideological shifts of the Court when a new justice is appointed and
confirmed. The work of Cottrell, Shipan, and Anderson notes one reason as to why the
replacement justice can swing the ideology of the bench so significantly. Banks and his
research expounds upon the research of Cottrell, Shipan, and Anderson as yet another
explanation for the ideological shifts from one justice to the next. Taken together, they
can show that the Court is largely influenced by outside forces when justices are being
placed to serve on the bench; however, once serving, a justice will not stray far from his
or her ideological philosophy as evidenced by the model detailing the longevity of the
natural court.
From this thesis, several avenues of further research remain. How can those tasked
with replacing justices practice better decision making to ensure their desired outcome?
Which justices had the greatest influences on the Court and how can their influence be
reflected in court categorization? What other impacts does a long natural court have
on public trust of the Court? A combined Supreme Court database will surely allow for
greater study in the field of judicial research as well as how academics and the public
understand the Court.
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